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Summary finidings
Under the Kyoto Protocol, industrial countries accept  Local impact. Will the project benefit its neighbors?
caps on their emissions of greenhouse gases. They are  For all the criteria except permanence, it is difficult to
permitted to acquire offsetting emissions reductions from  find generic distinctions between land use change and
developing countries - which do not have emissions  forestry and energy projects, since both categories
limitations - to assist in complying with these caps.  comprise diverse project types. The important distinctions
Because these emissions reductions are defined against a  among projects have to do with such things as:
hypothetical baseline, practical issues arise in ensuring  - The level and distribution of the project's direct
that the reductions are genuine. Forestry-related  financial benefits.
emissions reduction projects are often thought to present  *  How much the project is integrated with the larger
greater difficulties in measurement and implementation  system.
than energy-related emissions reduction projects.  * The project components'  internal homogeneity and
Chomitz discusses how project characteristics affect  geographic dispersion.
the process for determining compliance with each of the  *  The local replicability of project technologies.
criteria for qualifying. Those criteria are:  Permanence is an issue specific to land use change and
Additionality. Would the emissions reductions not  forestry projects. Chomitz describes various approaches
have taken place without the project?  to ensure permanence or adjust credits for duration:  the
*  Baseline and systems boundaries (leakage).  What  ton-year approach (focusing on the benefits from
would business-as-usual emissions have been without the  deferring climatic damage, and rewarding longer
project? And in this comparison, how broad should  deferral); the combination approach (bundling current
spatial and temporal system boundaries be?  land use change and forestry emissions reductions with
* Measurement (or sequestration). How  accurately can  future reductions in the buyer's allowed amount); a
we measure actual with-project emissions levels?  technology-acceleration approach; and an insurance
* Dluration or permanence. Will the project have an  approach.
enduring mitigating effect?
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Background and motivation
Under  the  Clean  Development  Mechanism,  developing  countries  will be  able to  produce  Certified
Emissions  Reductions  (CERs) (sometimnes  called offsets) through  projects that  reduce  greenhouse
gas  (GHG)  emissions  below  'business-as-usual'  levels.  The  CERs  can  be  used  by  developed
countries  to  satisfy, in part,  their  obligations  to keep  their  own  GHG  emissions  below  a specified
cap.  Similarly, economies in transition can produce  emissions reductions units  (ERU's)  through joint
implementation  (I)  projects.
Because it is much  cheaper,  on the  margin, for developing  countries to  abate GHIG emissions, this
arrangement  theoretically facilitates cost-effective achievement of any target for GHG  reduction.  For
instance,  Ellerman et al. (1998) find that the  global costs of achieving the  Kyoto Protocol  targets are
$120 billion if each nation must satisfy its commitments  purely through  domestic actions, but drop to
$54  billion  if trading  is  permitted  among  Annex  I  countries  and  further  to  $11  billion  if  CER
transfers  are permitted  and efficiently supplied.
However,  these gains are achieved only if the  CERs are 'real and  additional' - if they truly represent
reductions  from  a business-as-usual  baseline.  Because  that  baseline can not  be  directly observed,
some  observers fear that emissions reductions will be exaggerated (Greenpeace  1998). Transfer  of an
'exaggerated' CER to an Annex I country increases world GHG  emissions above the Kyoto levels.
Some observers  believe that  CERs from land use  change and forestry (LUCF) projects  are less likely
to be 'real and additional' than  CERs based on energy projects, and claim that LUCF projects are less
advantageous  to  host  countries  than  energy projects  (Greenpeace  1998, WWF  n.d.).  Largely for
these reasons, the  creditability of LUCF projects under the  CDM remains under debate  (Trexler and
Associates 1998).
This paper  argues that  -- with one  important  exception  -- LUCF  and  energy projects  face parallel,
comparable issues in measurement  and in assuring social and environmental benefits.  In general, it is
not  possible to assert that  energy projects are superior as a class to LUCF projects on these grounds;
rather,  each  subclass  of  projects  has  its  own idiosyncratic features  that  determine  the  appropriate
validation and certification approach.
The  paper  considers  in turn  each  of the  main criteria  suggested  for qualification of  a project  that
produces  CERs  ('carbon projects',  for convenience):
Adclditiorality:  Would the emissions reductions not have taken place in the absence of the project?
*  Baseline  and systans  boundanes  (leakage):  What would have been the  'business-as-usual'  emissions in
the  absence  of  the  project?  In  comparing  with-project  and  without-project  emissions,  how
broadly should we draw the spatial and temporal  boundaries of the system we are looking at?
*  Measurmmt: How  accurately can we measure the actual, with-project, levels of ermissions?
*  Penenan  Will  the  project  have  a  long-lasting  mitigating  effect  on  atmospheric  GHG
concentration  and on the economic  and social consequences  of global warming?
*  Local  social  azd ean  znvtal  impaat:  Wil  the project benefit its neighbors?
The paper  discusses how  project  characteristics affect the process  for determining  compliance with
each criterion, and considers whether these characteristics are systematically different  between energy
and LUCF projects.Evaluating  Carbon  Offsets  2
Additionality
CERs  are  quantified  as  the  difference  between  emissions  (or  sequestration)  with  the  project  as
compared  to  the  hypothetical  without-project  level.  Predicting  the  'but-for'  world  is  inherently
difficult,  and  both  buyers  and  sellers have  an  incentive  to  choose  predictions  of  high  baseline
emissions  (or low baseline sequestration).  If this occurs systematically, the volume of CERs  sold will
overstate  the  actual  emissions  reductions,  threatening  the  integrity  of  the  system.  Baseline
methodologies  must  strive  to  be  accurate  on  average  without  being  too  costly  and  difficult  to
implement.
Approaches  to  setting baselines will differ  substantially among  project types. Most  carbon  projects
involve  a  discrete  switch  in  technologies  or  choice  of  actions:  coal boiler  to  gas  boiler,  forest
protection  vs.  forest  conversion.  For  these projects,  it is often useful  to  distinguish  two  steps  in
determining the  baseline:
1. determining  additionality (is the new technology  adopted? When?) Only if the project  is shown to
be additional is it necessary to proceed to the second step:
2.  estimating  baseline  carbon  emissions  or  storage  (for  the  old  technology,  what's  the  rate  of
emissions?)
This  section  will concentrate  on  the  first step; the  following section  will examine the  reliability of
methodologies  for measuring carbon emissions or storage for a particular technology or situation.
There is some  inherent tension  between the requirement  that  carbon projects  be  additional and  the
requirement  that  they  promote  sustainable  development  - i.e., that  they  provide  some  benefit  in
addition to  GHG  abatement.  The greater the  noncarbon  benefits, the  more focused  these benefits
are on  the  project  sponsor,  and the  easier the  financing requirements,  the  greater the  presumption
that this project would be undertaken  spontaneously, in the business-as-usual scenanro.
Using this  simple framework, let's consider three  classes of carbon projects.
Class 1:  Direct financial benefits, low barriers to adoption
It is most  challenging to demonstrate  additionality where:
a) the  sponsor  is a large, commercial entity with good access to financing
b) the new technology is well-understood
c) investment  in the new technology  yields a direct monetary return to the  sponsor
Many  potential  projects,  both  LUCF  and  energy,  meet  this  description.  Industrial  timber  and
cellulose plantations,  for instance,  sequester  carbon  but  also produce  a stream of  revenue  or inputs
for  their  owners.  Cogeneration  and  methane  recovery  projects  produce  saleable or  usable  energy
streams;  improved  boilers  save  fuel  costs  and  reduce  the  cost  of  complying  with  air pollution
regulations;  installation  of  high-efficiency  electric  motors  reduces  expenditure  on  electricity;
reductions  of the  clinker proportion  in cement yields substantial energy savings.
The  challenge  is that  these  projects  make money  for their  owners.  Some  of these  projects  might
therefore  be undertaken  spontaneously, and won't be additional.  For others, the financial returns will
be  too  low  or  the  risks too  high to  justify the  investment.  These  latter  projects  are  particularly
attractive because the  net cost of supplying emissions reductions may be quite low.  That is, they may
require only a small carbon-funded  inducement to adopt the emissions-reducing technology.
There  has  been  extensive  debate  on  how  to  distinguish  additional  versus  nonadditional  projects,
balancing  error  rates against the  costs  of making  the  determination  (Chomitz  1998, Ellis and  Bosi
1999).  While  benchmarking  approaches  have practical  advantages, the  concept  of  additionality  is
more  directly  captured  by  simulating  the  project  sponsor's  investment  decision  process,  andEvaluating  Carbon  Qfsets  3
confirming that the sponsor would not undertake this project in the absence of CER prospects 1.
(Chomitz 1998)  For large commercial  ventures, this decision process is likely to involve a formal
financial analysis  that compares the level and risk of returns to the project with the returns from
other possible  investments.  Using this approach,  we can establish  that certain types of projects offer
benefits that not  large enough to induce investment without CER sales, and may therefore be
considered additional. For instance, Sedjo (1999) evaluates  the potential profitability of industrial
timber plantations in remote regions of Patagonia. These require investments  of $1150  per hectare.
But because  tree growth is slow and markets  are distant, the present value of returns, discounted  at a
modest 10%, is just $581,  over a 27 year period.  This strongly suggests  that even if wood price is
underestimated, these plantations are unattractive investments and are unlikely to  be established
without  the added inducement of CER sales.
Other projects - for instance, energy  efficiency  projects with  very short payback  periods, or cellulose
plantations in agroclimatically  suitable  areas  - may be attractive  enough to be adopted spontaneously
and will fail an additionality  test.  In between  is a gray  area where firrns  will have difficulty  deciding
on their course of action, because risk-adjusted  returns from investment will be comparable to
returns available  elsewhere. As a result, CER certifiers  will also have difficulty  in establishing  the
additionality  of these borderline  commercial  projects.
Class  11:  Direct  financial  benefits,  high  barriers  to adoption
Now consider projects  where:
a) the sponsor or actor is a small  business or household with limited  access  to financing
b) information about the new technology  is limited
c) investment in the technology  leads  to a direct but uncertain  monetary  return
Again both energy  and LUCF projects fall  into this class. Examples  include adoption of agroforestry
systems by small landholders and adoption of high-efficiency  light-bulbs  by households.  In both
cases, average  rates of return to investment can be reasonably  high, and yet the technologies  may not
be adopted. Lack of information,  lack of access  to financing,  and risk aversion  may all be obstacles
to  adoption.  On  the other  hand, these innovations are  sometimes adopted spontaneously, so
additionality  tests are needed. As in Case I, additionality  may be difficult  to determine  in some cases.
For instance, Stockholm  Environmental  Institute (SEI 1998)  performed a retrospective  analysis  of JI-
sponsored boiler conversions in  Estonia.  The baseline assumption was heating plants would
continue to use fuel oil despite potential savings from fuel-switching,  due to informational and
market barriers.  The analysis  found that the boilers  realized  considerable  cost savings  from switching
to renewables,  and that use of gas and renewables  in Estonia grew rapidly outside the JI-sponsored
projects. While  the JI projects might have help to diffuse  knowledge  and catalyze  earlier  adoption of
the new technologies,  it seems likely  that these technologies  would have been adopted fairly soon
even in the absence  of the projects,  in part because  of unexpected changes  in relative  fuel prices.
For this class of projects,  because there are typically  a large number of potential adopters, it may be
possible to use contmlgroup  methods to establish  baselines  and additionality. It may also be possible
directly  to model household decision  making and use the model to establish  baseline  behavior. Both
these approaches  have been used in the US to establish  baselines  for computing  energy savings  under
demand-side-management  incentive  programs. (Hagler  Bailly  1998)
1 A simulation  model  might  well be more complicated  than a simple  rate-of-return  test.  It will involve
parameters  that are imperfectly  observed,  such as the project  owner's  cost of capital. In practice,  then,
determination  of additionality  using  this approach  requires  both model  validation  and sensitivity  tests  against
variation  in  key  parameters.Evaluating  Carbon  Offsets  4
Class  Ill: Direct  financial  costs;  external,  possibly  nonmonetary  benefits
Some carbon  projects impose ongoing costs on the project owner but provide benefits to others  and
therefore  contribute  to  sustainable  development.  In  the absence of institutions  for beneficiaries to
compensate  project  owners,  these  projects  are  unlikely  to  be  undertaken  spontaneously,  and
therefore  are likely to be additional.
Some types  of LUCF  projects  fall into this  category.  A prominent  example is the  maintenance  of
forest  cover on land that  is suitable for agriculture.  It is now well-established that in the absence of
effective  regulation,  landholders  often  find it more  profitable  to  extract  saleable timber  from  the
forest  and  convert  it to  agriculture than  to  manage  the  primary  forest  for  sustainable  extraction.
(Tornich et al. 1998; Kishor  and Constantino  1993; Vosti, Witcover and Carpentier  1998; Arima and
Ubl 1997) Thus maintenance of forest cover imposes real opportunity  costs on the landholder,  and is
unlikely  to  occur  spontaneously  where  markets  for  timber  and  agricultural  goods  are  accessible.
Therefore  there is a strong  presumption  that  forest conservation  projects are additional  when they
occur in areas of demonstrable  pressure  for agricultural conversion.  At the  same time, maintenance
of  forest  cover  may  provide  benefits  to  the  landholder's  neighbors  and  compatriots  such  as
regulation of water flow, maintenance of water quality, and conservation  of biodiversity.
Similarly, projects  that  sponsor  restoration  of natural  habitats  using native  species are  likely to  be
additional.  These  projects  can be expensive relative to the  potential  financial returns  (if any) from
extractive  products,  given  the  relatively slow  growth  of  native  species,  and  are  therefore  rarely
undertaken  spontaneously.  However,  such projects might produce  valuable local benefits including
biodiversity  conservation  (restoration  of  degraded  habitats),  and  stream protection  (restoration  of
niverne  forests)  (Hardner, Frumhoff  and  Goetze, forthcoming).
Projects  of this  category are also possible in the energy sector.  Imagine, for instance,  a project  that
switches  vehicles or boilers  from  a high-carbon  to a low-carbon  fuel and  reduces air pollution,  but
requires  both  a substantial initial investment  and higher subsequent  operating  costs. Such a project
may be presumed  both additional and beneficial.
Summary
Ease of additionality determination  depends on the project's  returns and riskiness, and on the project
owner's access to finance and information.  These criteria cut across the energy vs. LUCF distinction.
Projects that provide financial returns to their owners - including many plantation  projects and many
energy efficiency projects  - offer potentially low costs  of carbon  emissions  reductions,  but  require
special attention  to additionality determination.  Projects that  impose  ongoing costs  on their  owners
but  benefit  a  larger  community  - including  forest  restoration,  forest  protection,  and  some  fuel-
switching projects - present  a clearer aprir  case for additionality.
Baseline  determination  and systems  boundaries
The previous section  distinguished between  additionality deternination  - would the  project really not
take place in the  absence of CER  sales - and baseline determination  - given that the  project would
not take place, what  are the projected  levels of  GHG  emissions or  storage?  It's useful  to  consider
two cases for baseline determination.  In the first case, it is reasonable to view the project in isolation
from  the  broader  economic  system.  In  the  second,  the  project  is integrally linked  with  the  larger
system, so that  baseline determination  must consider the  entire system.
Case  1:  Effectively  isolated  systems
Consider  a  project  that  sequesters  carbon  by  restoring  a  degraded  forest  ecosystem,  but  neither
produces  saleable timber  nor  displaces agricultural production.  Sequestration  on this  site therefore
does  not  appreciably  interact  with  the  rest  of  the  economic  system,  and  can  be  considered  inEvaluating  Carbon  Offsets  5
isolation. The baseline  question becomes:  in the absence  of active  intervention to re-establish  forest
cover, what is the expected rate of natural biomass accumulation  and carbon storage? It should be
possible to establish  the baseline  by reference to contemporaneous  or historical comparison plots.
This requires identification  of such plots and measurement  of biomass  over time (see  the section on
measurement, below). In some cases,  the baseline  may be straightforward  to establish  - it may be
possible to show, for instance,  that the initial, degraded  vegetation  never spontaneously  recovers
certain agroclimatic  circumstances. In other cases, we may observe natural regeneration in some
locations but not others, due to both biophysical  and anthropogenic  factors. Here, we will need to
explain  how these conditioning  factors would  influence  biomass  in the project location.
It is harder to imagine energy  projects that are completely  isolated from the energy  market, because
principle almost any change in fuel demand will have market-wide  repercussions (see discussion
below). For simplicity,  assume that these repercussions  are small  enough to be ignored. Consider, as
an example, a project that uses renewable energy to replace  diesel fuel in an off-grid rural electric
power station. The baseline scenario  will  have to make assumptions about the future path of diesel
capacity  utilization  in the without-project  scenario. Actual (with-project)  capacity  utilization  may or
may not be a good guide to the hypothetical without-project capacity  utilization, depending, for
instance, on whether installation  of the renewable  power plant catalyzes the development of new
rural industries,  and on fluctuations  in the price and availability  of diesel  fuel. The baseline scenanro
will also have to make assumptions about when the old diesel  plant would have been retired, and
what would  have replaced  it.
In both the energy  and the LUCF examples,  it is necessary  to project future behavior of people and
biological or  mechanical systems.  The  use  of  past  behavior (fuel consumption  or  natural
regeneration  rates) as a guide  to the future may be reasonable  in some circumstances,  unreasonable  in
others. (SEI 1998).  Dynarmic  baselines  may be useful for both LUCF and energy  projects  to allow for
unexpected changes in the prices of fuel or agricultural  commodities.  Because  this case involves
circumscribed  project sites, it may be possible  to identify control groups and use their emissions as a
baseline.
Case /I:  Integrated systems
In general,  most projects involving  forest protection or on-grid power generation  must be viewed  as
part of a larger system.  To assess  the impact of the project on emnissions,  it's necessary  to consider
the behavior  of the overall  system.
Forest protection projects
Preventing deforestation  is a theoretically  attractive  route for GHG emissions reductions for several
reasons. Tropical deforestation alone  accounts for about 20% of total GHG emissions. The private
opportunity costs of reducing deforestation may be low in areas being converted to  pasture or
subsistence  crops. While  the private benefits of deforestation are often low, they are usually  positive
- which means that the case for additionality  is strong, as noted in the previous section. Finally,
forest conservation  can yield  multiple  environmental  cobenefits.
However, some observers are concerned about the potential  inaccuracy  of baseline  construction for
forest  protection projects.  There  are two  concerns.  First, is it possible  to prdict witXut-prc*t
deforestation  rates  and patterns? Clearly there  are vast stretches of forest that  are not at  risk  of
deforestation;  claims  of CERs for 'protection' of these forests would frustrate the aims of the Kyoto
Protocol.  Second, in principle  pvtaiion of oae  plot  offorest  mi*htnmev  result  in the  dirsin  of  defostation
pressures  to a neighkrring  plot - the 'leakage'  problen. How can we define  the boundaries of the project
system so as to ensure  that leakage  is accounted  for?Evalsating  Carbon  Cffsets  6
Phed
Deforestation is not a random phenomenon.  On the contrary, research over the past decade has
established that deforestation is motivated to a large extent by the profits from a combination of
timber  exploitation and agricultural conversion.  Consequently, recent work  on  the  economic
geography  of deforestation has shown that spatial  patterns of deforestation are highly  predictable  as a
function of road and market proximity,  topography, and agroclimatic  suitability  (Chomitz  and Gray
1996;  Mamingi,  Chomitz, Gray and Lamnbin  1996;  Deininger and Minten 1996;  Pfaff 1997;  Nelson
and Hellerstein 1997;  Mertens and Lambin 1997). For instance,  Chomitz and Gray (1996)  show that
in  Belize, commercial agriculture locates in  flat  areas near  roads, while  subsistence-oriented
agriculture  favors areas with high soil fertility. They demonstrate a simple but theoretically  well-
grounded methodology for predicting  areas at high risk of subsequent deforestation. Alves (1999)
demonstrates  that over  the past 20 years, deforestation  in Brazil  has expanded  incrementally  outward
from areas  cleared  as of 1978;  these areas,  in turn, closely  follow  the road network. (See  also Liu etal.
1993  for a similar  analysis  of the Philippines.) Nepstad etal. (1998)  provide a geographical  model of
fire susceptibility  in the Amazon. Thus we have both theories and tools to identify forest areas that
are high risk for deforestation and consequent  carbon release.
Less progress has been made in predicting  the rate  at which these high-risk  areas are deforested.  This
reflects the lack of places in the developing world for which reliable annual time-series data of
deforestation exist. In the Brazilian Amazon, where annual data exist for the period 1988-1996,
annual rates have  been  volatile but without  obvious trend.  Until more  time-series data on
deforestation are available,  a conservative  approach to baseline determination  would be to identify
areas with a very  high likelihood  of clearance  over a 10 year period. This could be done by: a) using
spatial models to  map relative risk of deforestation; b) assuming that  the highest-risk areas are
deforested first, applying  conservative  deforestation rates (e.g.  below  the mean rate for the previous
decade) to map the areas  likely  to be deforested  in the coming  decade.
Leakage
People clear or  degrade forests in  order to  extract timber, or to  use the  land for  agriculture.
Protection of  a forest  plot potentially reduces the  supply of crops and tree  products, and  of
opportunities for formal or subsistence  employment.  Markets  may react by encouraging  extractive  or
agricultural  conversion activities  in a different, unprotected forest plot.  To the extent that this
happens,  the apparent  project-sponsored  emissions  reduction 'eaks' out of another forest area.
Under what circumstances  would we expect leakage  to be significant? Leakage might be very high
where deforestation is undertaken by shifting cultivators of subsistence crops, with relatively  fixed
annual requirements for clearance  and a wide geographic  scope of activity.  In this situation, simple
protection of a forest plot - without interventions to address the cultivators' food needs - would
probably not be an effective  means of reducing  carbon emissions.
This  view of  deforestation may however have limited applicability.  Studies of  deforestation
increasingly  show that it geographically  circumscribed and strongly linked to  markets.  As noted
earlier, most deforestation occurs near roads and  markets, and even subsistence production is
somewhat sensitive  to market access (Chomitz and Gray 1996). A village-level  census of Indonesia
showed that, in most  forest areas, villages experiencing deforestation had high proportions  of
households engaged  in the production of export-oriented  tree crops. (Chomitz and Griffiths 1997).
In  many places, deforestation may  be linked to  large commercial operators rather  than  small
subsistence farners.  For instance,  MINPE  (1999) reports that 52% of deforestation in the Brazilian
Amazon  during  1997  occurred  in  individual clearings greater  than  100 hectares.  Because
deforestation exhibits  such strong market-linked  patterns, spatial  models of deforestation provide a
useful platform for understanding  leakage.Evaluating  Crbon (fsets  7
The  venerable  von  Thiinen  model  (von  Thiinen  1966; Angelsen  1995; Chomitz  and  Gray  1996;)
provides  such  a platform.  In  this  well-tested model,  farmgate prices  for  agricultural commodities
decline with increasing distance from  the market.  Hence  the profitability of agricultural production
or  forest  extraction  declines with distance; the  economic  frontier  of  production  is  defined where
profits  decline to zero.  Beyond this  point there  is no market-oriented  deforestation.  In this  model,
the  degree  of  leakage will depend  crucially on  the  price-elasticity of  demand  at  the  market.  (See
Appendix  for an  illustrative formal model.)  If the  market  is a port,  the  product  in question  is an
export  commodity,  and  price  is set  by world  markets,  then  there  will be  relatively little  leakage.
Protection  of a forest area within the  'price-shed'  of the port  thus puts little upward pressure  on the
world  price and therefore  does not  appreciably shift out the  economic  frontier  - meaning that  the
rate of leakage is smal12. Leakage may be severe, on the other hand, if deforestation  is motivated  by a
locally-consumed  commodity  whose demand is relatively inelastic - for instance, a staple food  such
as rice.  In this  case, protection  of an area bids up the price at the marketplace, thereby  extending the
economic  frontier.  But this  effect may be moderated  by the tendency  of higher prices to elicit more
intensive production.  Therefore  leakage is expected to  be less than  100%; part  of  the  shortfall  in
production  resulting  from  protection  is  met  through  intensification  rather  than  extensification.
Leakage will be especially low if the protected  area is directly at the economic  frontier,  where  output
per hectare is the lowest.
There  are  two  ways to  deal with  leakage.  One  is to  expand  the  scope  of  the  system  so  as  to
'internalize' the leakage.  For instance, the area for which carbon is measured  could be drawn so as to
include the  regional cattle or food  market.  An attractive  alternative is to design the project  so as to
be  leakage-neutralizing  (Brown  et al.  1997).  For  instance,  a  forest  protection  project  could  be
combined  with  a project  that  sponsors  intensified  cattle  raising in  existing pasture  areas.  If  the
intensification  component  supplies  more  beef  and  absorbs  more  labor  than  the  protection
component  displaces, then,  arguably, there  is no  leakage. The intensification  component  also serves
directly to  diminish pressures  for deforestation.  Note  that  the intensification  component  need not
threaten  the  forest  under  protection,  reducing  the  chance  of  unintended  carbon  release.  For
instance,  intensification  could  be  promoted  through  road  system  improvements  in  areas without
forests that supply the same food markets.
In  fact,  as many  authors  have pointed  out,  leakage can be  benign. That  is, a project  may  catalyze
additional GHG  ermissions  reductions in other locations.  For instance, establishment  of a sustainable
timber  plantation  will not  only result in carbon  sequestration,  it will also tend  to  depress the  world
price  of  timber.  This  will reduce  the  incentive  to  exploit  native  forests  for  tirnber.  (Sohngen,
Mendelsohn  and  Sedjo 1998). As  a result, the  returns  to  'liquidating'  and  converting  native  forests
will decline, reducing carbon  emissions from forest conversion3.
Grid-connected energy projects
Many  carbon  projects propose  to  reduce C02  emissions  by sponsoring  the  construction  of  electric
generation  facilities  powered  by  efficient  gas  combustion  or  by  renewable  energy  (e.g.,  solar,
hydroelectric,  geothermal,  or renewable biomass fuels). In some cases, the new climate-friendly plant
is proposed  as a substitute  for a conventional  (e.g. coal-fired) plant of identical capacity.  In this  case
the  systems boundary  is clear and there  is no leakage (except for the market effects describing in the
following subsection).
2 Leakage  may be generated  if protection depresses  the wages  of labor, thereby shifting  the frontier outwards.
The effect on wages  depends on the mobiliy of labor.
3 However, establishment of carbon plantations  will tend to 'crowd out' commercial plantations - another
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Often, however, the proposed carbon project adds to the grid a new power plant whose capacity
does not correspond to that  of any planned conventional  plants.  Now the project's impacts on
GHG emissions can only be assessed by considering  the emissions of the entire grid. Addition of
the new plant affects grid-wide  performance  in two ways. First, presence of the new plant will affect
investment decisions  in other plants.  Installation  of large, 'umpy' plants may be deferred for some
time. (Swaminathan  and Fankhauser,  nd.).  The result might be either positive or negative leakage
depending of the characteristics  of the deferred plant - whether, for instance, it is a coal plant or a
hydro plant.  Second, connection of the new, project-supported  plant will change pattems of plant
dispatching  (assignment  of loads among  plants) (EIA n.d.).  Electric grids are managed  to minimize
generation cost, using low-cost sources first and operating high-cost (typically  carbon-intensive)
plants only during periods of peak demand or when hydropower  reservoirs are low. The effect on
GHG emnissions  of a new wind turbine, for instance,  depends on daily  and annual utilization  patterns
of both the new plant and existing  plants.  Depending on how much electricity  is demanded, when
peak demands occur, when the wind blows, and when the reservoirs  are dcy,  the wind turbine might
substitute for electricity  from high or low emissions  plants.
A rigorous estimate of emissions  reductions from a grid-based  energy project therefore requires: 1)
simulation of system-wide  plant capacity  expansion;  2) simulation  of capacity utilization and load
dispatching  under a probability-weighted  range of weather scenarios.  Simulation  models are available
for  this purpose; often they are part of the tool-kit of a national planning authority. Simulation
studies  may indicate  when simpler  models  yield  adequate  predictions.
Energy market considerations
Almost all energy-related  carbon projects decrease  the demand for fossil fuels. The combined effect
of these actions will be to reduce the price of fossil  fuels, particularly  coal and oil. As a result, fossil
fuel consumers who are not constrained by the Kyoto Protocol - that is, consumers in CDM or
nonsignatory countries that are not participating  in a CDM project - will  increase  their consumption
of fossil fuels and emissions of C02.  This market-based leakage  has rarely been discussed in the
context of energy-related  carbon projects (but see Michaelowa  1997  and Martin 1998). However, it
is perfectly analogous  to the market-based  leakage  of carbon that results from intervention in wood
plantations.
The extent of market-based  leakage  depends on the supply for and demand of fuel. Suppose that we
write the applicable  (national  or possibly  global)  supply curve for coal as:
P=  S0+S1 Q
S1> 0
Suppose that a particular  facility  has inelastic  demand for coal:
Q=6c)
and that the overall  demand  curve can be written as:
Q= (do+oo)  +d 1P
d1<0
Now suppose that a carbon project switches  the facility  out of coal into solar power.  The project
therefore claims a reduction in carbon emissions of about  oo tons (assuming for  simplicity of
exposition  one ton of carbon emissions  per ton of coal combusted).
However,  the actual decline  in marketwide  coal consumption  is:
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This means that a proportion -disl/[l-disi] of the claimed  emissions  reduction has 'eaked' back into
the atmosphere  through market effects4.  Note that this proportion is independent of the scale 8o of
the reduction. It doesn't matter if the project is very small  relative  to the market; according  to this
logic,  the scale  of the leakage  is proportional  to the scale  of the project.
For leakage  to  be significant,  however, demand has to  be relatively  elastic and supply has to be
relatively  inelastic.  Intuitively,  the project-led  reduction in demand has to have a large price impact
(inelastic  supply),  which in turn has to induce a big 'snap-back'  effect among nonparticipating  energy
consumers (elastic  demand).  Note that
dis1 ED/  ES
where d1s 1 =  SD and es are the price-elasticities  of demand and supply. These magnitudes  will differ
from place  to place,  and over time. The overall  price elasticity  of demand for energy  in Asia has been
estimated (Pesaran  and Smith, 1995)  at -.37, but the price elasticity  for a particular fuel such as coal
will be higher.  A review of sector-specific  fossil fuel price elasticity  estimates  in India, Korea, and
Thailand, Asia reported highly elastic demand in the basic metals industry (-1.65 to -3.07)  and
varying  elasticities  in chernicals  (-0.38  to -1.81). (Ishiguro  and Akiyama,  1995).  Supply  elasticies  are
more elusive. A recent econometric study of the US coal market (Mellish,  nd.) estimated 1/Es =
.117.  A study of the Australian market found a less elastic response, with Es=  1.9.  (IEA 1995).
World supply  will be more elastic  than supply within any one country. These scattered estimates  do
not support a definitive  calculation  of leakage,  but do suggest  that leakage  could be nonnegligible  in
some circumstances  and underline  the need for more attention  to this issue.
If the  project replaces gas-fired power plants with renewable energy, however, leakage could be
negative. That is, system-wide  carbon savings  could exceed  those calculated  at the project location.
This could happen if the price of natural gas is depressed, inducing substitution away from more
carbon-intensive  fuels.
Technical diffusion and negative leakage
Some emissions-reducing  technologies are privately profitable, but  are poorly understood  and
therefore not adopted.  Carbon projects can reduce emissions by overcoming these information
barriers.  Such projects could catalyze adoption of  the  new technologies outside the  formal
boundaries of the project, as information  diffuses  and perceived  risk and uncertainty  declines. This
too would result in negative  leakage. These indirect  impacts  could be quite large.
Information-diffusion  impacts are likely  to be larger  where the technology  is small scale and readily
replicable. These characteristics  cut across  the energy  vs. LUCF distinction.  Demonstration of easily
replicated  technologies  for households, farms or small  enterprises  - agroforestry  techniques,  pasture
intensification technologies, household energy efficiency options - reduces uncertainty among
potential adopters,  triggering  diffusion  of the innovation5.
Summary
Most carbon projects - both energy and LUCF - have indirect effects on the economic and physical
systems in which they are embedded.  By changing  market prices and diffusing  information,  these
4 This is an overstatement.  Some  of the increase  in coal consumption  results  from switches  away  from oil  or
gas. Reduced  emnissions  from  these  fuels  compensates  for  some  of the leakage.  As long  as these  fuels  are  more
carbon-intensive  than coal,  the net effect  is positive  leakage.
5 See  Current,  Lutz,  and  Scherr  (1998)  regarding  demonstration  effects  in agroforestry.Evaluatzng  Carbon  Ofsets  10
projects  can  have  far-reaching,  even  global impacts  on  GHG  emissions  and  sequestration.  As  a
result, the total net  emissions reduction  due to the project can be greater or less than  that measured
at the project site.
Baseline  emissions  scenarios therefore  have to describe  the  behavior  of the  entire system. In  some
cases  we  have  relatively  sophisticated  tools  for  modeling  systems  behavior.  It  is  possible  that
experience with these models will show that simple rules of thumb  are sufficient to estimate  baseline
emissions in many circumstances.
Forest  protection  projects have both  disadvantages and  advantages in baseline construction  relative
to energy and other types of projects. The principal disadvantage is that  it is hard to predict year-to-
year  deforestation  rates.  However,  methodologies  are  available to  predict the  total  area subject  to
deforestation  (and therefore  the  total  release of  C02)  over the  medium  to  long  run.  By coupling
forest protection  projects with agricultural intensification projects, leakage can be neutralized  or  even
reversed.
Measurement
Ermissions  reductions  are  the  difference  between  baseline  levels  and  actual  levels.  To  quantify
emissions  reductions, we need cheap, accurate means of quantifying actual emissions levels.
For project work, measurement  generally relies on appropriately  calibrated proxies: fuel consumption
(for energy projects) and change in the  stock of biomass (for LUCF projects).  The cost of measuring
and  calibrating  these  proxies  depends  on  the  heterogeneity  and  geographical  dispersion  of  the
systems being measured.
C02  emissions for combustion  sources can be estimated  at negligible cost  given information  about
fuel consumption  and fuel composition.  Fuel consumption  is routinely tracked, and can be converted
to C02  emissions using fuel-specific values6 of emissions/ton  together with an assumption  of a 99%
combustion  rate  (ELA, n.d.).  The  accuracy  of  the  estimate  depends  on  the  accuracy  of  the
emissions/ton  parameter,  which  will vary with  changes  in  fuel composition;  coal,  for instance  is
heterogeneous  in this  parameter.  Emissions  of other  greenhouse  gases are much  more  sensitive to
the particular type of combustion  technology  and pollution  control equipment,  and therefore  require
technology-specific  parameters,  possibly  prone  to  uncertainty.  Emissions  of  C02  can  also  be
monitored  directly using continuous  emissions monitors  (CEMs).  These  cost $150,000 (Chin 1998),
with an operating cost of about  $ 100,000/year per monitor7  .
Monitoring  and measurement  costs increase for projects that  involve a large number  or  geographic
dispersion  of  actions  or  objects.  In  the  energy sector, examples include  fuel-switching projects  for
transport  fleets, and energy efficiency projects aimed at households, commercial  buildings, and  small
businesses.  For  these  projects,  it may  be  necessary to  track  energy  consumption  at  thousands  or
possibly  hundreds  of thousands  of  geographically dispersed  facilities.  As the  number  of units  gets
larger and emissions/unit  decreases, this leads to a statistical sampling scheme.
Statistical  samnpling  is also the  basis for  monitoring  the  biomass  in  forests,  plantations,  and  soils.
Sampling  techniques  are  well-developed,  drawing on  decades  of  experience  in  conducting  forest
inventories  (NMacDicken  1998; Vine Sathaye and Makundi 1999). Forest  areas are stratified according
to vegetation  type.  Sample plots  are chosen  in each strata, and  several measurements  are taken  on
trees  in the  sample  plots.  Calibration  equations  relate these  measurements  to  total  tree  biomass.
Carbon/biomass  parameters  are developed  and applied to convert  biomass measurements  to stored
6 In fact, the EIA multiplies  two fuel specific  parameters:  (thermal  content/ton)*(ernissions/thermal  content)
7 Data from EPRI, http://www.epri.com/corporate/products_services/collaborative_mem/pf99/trgtC83.htrnlEvaluating  Carbon  Qfrets  11
carbon. Independent  measurements  must be taken  of other  carbon  pools,  such as soil  carbon  and
leaf  litter.
The  total cost of sample-based  measurement  depends  on the  unit cost  per sample  and the  number  of
samples. The accuracy  depends,  to a first approximation,  on the number of samples  and on the
homogeneity  but  not  the  size  of the universe  being  sampled.  This principle  is familiar  from the world
of opinion  sampling,  where  about  the same  sample  size  is required  to assess  opinions  in a state or in
an entire  nation. Consequently  there  will  be large  economies  of scale  in measuring  carbon  stocks  in
forest  projects.
To illustrate  the relation  between  cost and project  scale,  consider  the analysis  presented  by Powell
(1999),  based  on data  for the carbon  project  at the Noel Kempff  Mercado  Climate  Action  Plan. The
analysis  computes  the cost of measuring  the carbon  in a heterogeneous  634,000  hectare  forest  area,
containing  118  milion tons of carbon,  at different  levels  of accuracy  and statistical  significance.  The
unit cost per sample  plot ranges  from $230  to $281. The number  of samples,  and thus the cost,
increases  approximately  with the inverse  square  of the confidence  interval.  Estimation  of the mean
to within ± 10%,  with 95% confidence,  would require  81 sample  plots and cost $19,000  (not
including  setup costs). A confidence  interval  of ± 5% would  require  452  sample  plots at a cost of
$108,000,  or less  than $0.001/ton.  Another  halving  of the confidence  interval  would  boost costs  to
half  a penny  per ton.
Costs/ton of quantifying  emissions  ndusion  (rather  than stock)  could  be higher,  depending  on how
the baseline  is defined  and what  the baseline  deforestation  rate  is. Suppose  that  the spatial  prediction
models  mentioned  earlier  are  used  to identify  areas  that  will  be deforested  over  the next  20  years,  and
that these  areas  comprise  10%  of the total area  and biomass.  One quantification  approach  would  be
to estimate  the carbon  contained  in the baseline  deforestation  region.  At the end of the project,  if
remote  sensing  shows  that there  has been  no disturbance  of the area,  then this estimate  is taken as
the amount of emissions  reductions. If the survey costs are approximately  the same, then
measurement/ton  of emission  reductions  is now ten times greater  than before, but still only
$0.01/ton.
To take  a much  less  favorable  scenario,  suppose  that baseline  emissions  are stipulated  as 10  million
tons, actual  emissions  are  estimated  as:
(initial  carbon  stock  - end of project  carbon  stock)
and emissions  reductions  are  calculated  as:
10  million  - (initial  carbon  stock  - end of project  carbon  stock)
Suppose  now that independent  samples  are carried  out to estimate  initial  and final  carbon stocks.
Because  actual  emissions  are estimated  as the difference  between  two independent  estimates,  the
variance  of the difference  is the sum of the variance  of the two stock estimates. To keep the
confidence  interval  of the difference  small  relative  to the expected  emissions  reduction  of 10  miDlion,
it is now  necessary  to use a much  smaller  confidence  interval,  say  1%. This boosts  the costs  of each
survey  to an unrealistic  $2 million8  - unrealistically  high because  there  would  be economies  of scale
in sampling  and other  measurement  technologies  would  likely  be brought  to bear. Even  so, the cost
per ton of emission  reduction  is only  about  $0.40.
In summary,  projects  that involve  large  point  sources  of combustion  wil tend to have  low per-ton
ermissions  measurement  costs.  The cost per ton of measuring  carbon stored in biomass  will be
approximately  inversely  proportional  to  the size of  the  carbon sink, making measurement
inexpensive  in large  projects  but expensive  in very small,  heterogeneous  ones.  The latter would
8  Own calculations  based  on  data  supplied  by  Mark  Powell.Evaluating  Caribn QDsets  12
require some kind of stipulated  carbon storage parameters in order to be viable. However, rapidly
evolving  technologies  for aerial  and satellite  surveys  could result in order-of-magnitude  decreases  in
survey costs.
Permanence 9
A peculiar feature  of most LUCF projects is the possible reversibility  of carbon sequestrationlo.  That
is, the carbon embodied  in a plantation or protected forest is always  at risk of accidental  or deliberate
release. (However,  Fisher et al. 1994 report that introduction of deep-rooted grasses  to Colombian
savannas results in 7.8 tons/hectare/year of soil carbon sequestration,  most of which is well below
the plough layer and therefore arguably  resistant  to subsequent  oxidation.) In contrast, a properly-
accounted-for  reduction  in current fossil-fuel  consumption  will result in a centuries-long  reduction in
atmospheric C02 levels. Is there any value,  then, to emissions  reductions from LUCF projects? If
so, how does the value of a ton of LUCF reductions compare to  a ton produced by an energy
project?
There are two approaches  to assigning  value to LUCF-based  reductions. The first is to  assess the
environmental  and economic benefits of commitments  to limited-term sequestration agreements-
for instance,  projects that guarantee  to keep a plantation or threatened forest standing for 30 years.
These benefits are then compared to the benefits of permanent emissions reductions projects in
order to derive a conversion  or discount factor for limited-term  reductions.  The second approach is
to devise  mechanisms  that provide  reasonable  assurance  of indefinite  sequestration.
Limited term commitments
Limited  term commnitments  to carbon sequestration  offer practical and political advantages. First, it
may be possible to arrange  for formal insurance of 5 to 30 year commitments. Second, some host
countries may not want to provide perpetual guarantees of unchanged land use, seeing this as an
unacceptable constraint on  sovereignty. They may also be reluctant to  forfeit the option values
associated  with the possible future emergence  of high value land uses.  Perhaps for these reasons,
existing  LUCF projects often specify  limited-term  commitments.
Limited-term commnitments  help to mitigate climate change and its impacts in several ways. First,
postponing emissions  will postpone some radiative  forcing.  Radiative  forcing has a cumulative  effect
on the clirnate. As a result, a temporary sequestration  project shifts downward  the future time path
of temperature increases (or other climatic effects). In  other words, thanks to  such a project,
temperature  is a bit lower at every date in the future than it would have been. Darnage levels  at each
point in time will be a little lower. If society  has a positive discount rate, postponement of damages
represents an economic  benefit.
Second,  there is a physical  advantage  to postponing  C02  emissions. The marginal  impact of C02  on
radiative  forcing declines  as C02 concentration  in the atmosphere  increases. (Albritton et a! 1994.)
Thus by postponing the release  of some C02  until a time when concentrations  will have increased,
we have softened  its impact.
Third, postponing emissions  may buy time for technological  progress  in abatement. If sequestration
is cheap, and if the marginal  cost of abating industrial  emissions  is declining  or growing  more slowly
than the discount rate, temporary sequestration  may be a good bargain.
9 This  section  draws  and and  expands  Chornitz  (1998b).
10  The issue  rmight  conceivably  apply  also  to underground  sequestration  of C02 from industrial  ernissions.Evaluating  Carbon  Qfsets  13
Finally,  and perhaps most important, some temporary sequestration  may turn out to be permanent.
Over the  next  30 years, much  forest in developing countries may be  converted to  low-value
agricultural  land, which is subsequently abandoned as higher wages and intensified agricultural
technologies discourage  subsistence  farmning  and extensive  pasture at the agricultural  frontier.  This
pattern  of agricultural  expansion and contraction has been historically  observed in the  US and
Western Europe (Walker 1993)  and more recently in Malaysia  (Vincent and Al,  1997).  Therefore,
some limited-term sequestration commitments  may result in permanent forest protection.  At the
end of the commitment period a combination of reduced pressure for agricultural  conversion and
increased  local demand for environmental  amenities  may result in indefinite  protection of forests that
would otherwise  have been destroyed  for ephemeral  economic  gains. This yields permanent carbon
emissions reductions if natural regrowth on abandoned agricultural  lands does not attain the same
biomass densities as the original forest.  In tropical areas, incomplete biomass recovery  may result
from  land  degradation due  to  compaction, fire, erosion, or  local climate change induced  by
deforestation (Cochrane  et  al. 1999).
These considerations  have prompted suggestions of 'ton-year' crediting schemes.  Projects would
receive  fractional credits for each year that a ton of carbon is kept out of the atmosphere. This is
attractive  from the viewpoint  of the world community  because  the project owner bears all the risk of
nonperformance. It is attractive  to project hosts who wish to preserve future land use options, even
if they are unlikely  to exercise  them. Clearly  the equivalence  factor (ton-years/'perpetual'  ton) affects
project viability and environmental  impacts. There is however no  unique way to  determine the
conversion rate between ton-years  and perpetual tons.  Rather, a number of scientifically  justifiable
approaches  can be suggested  and the choice  among them is a policy  decision.
A very similar  problem arises  in deriving  equivalency  measures  for different  greenhouse gases. These
differ both in their impact per kilogram and in the length of time that they stay resident in the
atmosphere.  For instance, the instantaneous radiative  forcing (in watts/cubic meter/kg of gas) of
HCFC-225a is nearly a thousand times greater than that  of C02,  but the former's atmospheric
lifetime  is ordy about 2.5 years.  (Albritton et al. 1994).  How then can we assess the relative cost-
effectiveness  of abating  the emissions  of these gases?
The Kyoto Protocol requires the use of global  wanring potentials (GWP) to compute the carbon
dioxide equivalences  of the other five recognized greenhouse gases (article 5, paragraph 3).  The
GWP is a simple-to-compute proxy for climate impact (Lashof and Ahuja 1990). The absolute
global  warming  potential for a particular  gas  is given by (Albritton  etaL 1994):
7.
AGWPm=  f cx(t)dt
where a is a gas-specific  value  representing  the radiative  forcing effect of a unit of the gas and x(t) is
the gas-specific  proportion remaining at time t  of a unit pulse of the gas at time 0; oc may be a
function of t  and of x, but for simplicity  is treated as a constant here.  The global  warming potential
therefore represents the cumulative  forcing effect up to an arbitrarily-chosen  time point T.  The
(relative)  GWP is the ratio of a gas's absolute  GWP to that of C02, the numeraire  gas. An addendum
to the Kyoto Protocol" specifies  the use of a 100  year time horizon for these calculations.
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This approach  can be applied directly to  a project that  delays deforestation-related  emissions  by one
year.  The result is an  equivalence factor  of about  .0075 ton-years/'perpetual'  ton'2. (is  does  not,
however, allow for any possibility that the emissions reduction might persist after one year.)  A factor
of  this  magnitude  would  be  too  low  to  motivate  most  LUCF  projects;  it mnight suffice  to  deter
conversion  of high-density primary forest to low-value pasture.
The GWP  approach has the advantages of simplicity and precedent. However,  the  application of this
approach  to  calculating  greenhouse  gas  equivalencies  has  been  widely  criticized  (Eckaus  1992,
Schmalensee  1993; Kandlikar  1996). First, the global warming potential  does not  adequately capture
the  complexities  or  dimensions  of  climatic impacts.  Second, the  100 year  horizon  is  an  arbitrary
choice.  Third,  and relatedly, the use of  a zero  discount rate is also arbitrary  and difficult to defend.
Thus, rather than looking at a measure of the  climatic impact at an arbitrary point in time (the GWP's
single horizon), we should compute the project's  impact on mitigating damages from  climate change.
In the  special case of a linear damage function, and projects which postpone  deforestation  processes
for a fixed period, the  gains from  the limnited-term  project  are those  associated with discounting the
damages over the  duration  of the project period.  On  this  approach, postponing  deforestation  by 20
years is worth one third as much as preventing it forever at a 2% discount rate, and 86% as much  at a
10% discount  rate. In  fact, this approach  gives a simple rule for computing the  value of  a 'ton-year'
of sequestration services: one ton-year  = r perpetual tons, where r is the discount rate.  The choice of
an  appropriate  social long-term  discount rate has been  much  debated.  A recent  workshop  devoted
to  this  topic  achieved  a consensus  in favor  of  using a positive  discount  rate  for  assessing clirnate
policies over multigeneration  time-spans  (Portney and Weyant  1999).
Mechanisms for assuring indefinite sequestration
Host  countries  may  favor  projects  that  promise  indefinite  sequestration,  where  this  promotes
national goals such as watershed protection  and restoration  of national parks. Here the challenge is to
devise mechanisms  to  assure the  world  community that  emissions  reductions  associated with  these
projects  are long-lived.  Three  such mechanisms  are suggested here.
Discounting  for risk
An obvious approach  is to partially credit emissions reductions according to the  likelihood that  they
will endure  for a specified period  such as  100 years.  For  instance, relatively high credits would  be
given to  sequestration  on lands unambiguously protected  by national  law, with well-functioning  and
securely-funded  monitoring  and  enforcement  agencies13.  Lower  crediting  levels  would  apply  to
plantations.  In this way the overall portfolio  of LUCF-based  CERs would be mutually insured.  This
generalizes  the  self-insurance  scheme that  Costa  Rica has  applied  to  its  offering  of  forest-backed
enussions  reductions  under  the  Protected  Areas Project.  In  its  first year  of  operation,  it will only
offer  for  sale half emissions  reductions  it plans to  produce.  The  rest  serve  as an  insurance  buffer
(Chomitz et al. 1999).  The quantity of tons held in reserve varies from  plot to plot based on the risk
of nonperformance  or loss.
12 To derive the equivalence  factor, consider that the GWP of a unit pulse of C02 in year zero is go=fax(t),
where the integral  is taken from t=0 to 100. The GWP of a unit pulse of C02 emitted in year 1 is gi=|Jax(t)
where now the integral  is taken from t=0  to 99. A project that postpones C02  release  by one year therefore
yields a reduction, relative to the perpetual project, of 1-gl/gO. Tipper and de Jong (1998)  and Moura Ccsta
(1999)  derive a different, higher figure  by calculating  Jcox(t)  = approx 60 and concluding  that 60 ton-years =
one 'perpetual'  ton (my  terminology).
13 The Brazilian  state of Parana uses such a rating system in determining  the size of fiscal incentives  paid to
municipios  (counties)  for protected areas. (Loureiro  1998).Evaluatzng  Carbon  (fsets  15
In this approach, the risks of collective  under or over performance  would be borne by the world
community.  (Because  of the long-term nature of the concerns, it is probably not feasible to find
commercial  insurance for these risks). It would probably be necessary  for a centrally-designated  task
force to detennine appropriate rules for assigning  risk discounts. These rues  could be revised over
time, based on project experience.
Setting the partial crediting factor is analogous  to setting baselines. If set too high - above the real
but unknown value - these factors will overestimate  the quantity of CER's produced, resulting in
more GHG emissions  than anticipated. If set too low, the world will enjoy an emissions reduction
dividend on approved projects - but valid projects may be discouraged,  raising  the overall  cost of
meeting emissions  reductions  goals.
Bundling LUCF activities with subsequent emissions reduction activities
An  alternative is to  bundle  a  temporary carbon-sequestration project with  a  commitment to
undertake a follow-on  action that ensures  the permanence  of the carbon gain. Assurne,  for instance,
that the Protocol results in a market for carbon allowances  based on countries' "assigned  amounts".
Then the buyer of CERs from a 5-year sequestration  project might commit to retire an equivalent
tonnage of allowances  at the end of the 5 year term.  Then, even in the worst-case  scenario - release
of all the sequestered carbon- the time path of net emissions  reductions  would be the same as that
associated  with a current energy-related  emissions  abatement project or the current retirement of an
allowance.  In the more likely scenario of some continued sequestration after the project ends, the
climatic  impact of the "bundle" would be more favorable. A variant  would allow  the buyer to renew
the sequestration  project for another fixed  tern,  deferring  the comnitment.
The bundling approach addresses the concerns of those who fear that LUCF projects are merely
palliative  and do  not help to  reduce the long-term emissions growth trend. An alternative view
emphasizes  the value of buying  time to pursue low-cost abatement opportunities as capital stocks
tum over. It is prohibitively  expensive  to scrap current capital equipment such as generators, cars,
and buildings,  even if the equipment is energy-inefficient  and carbon-intensive.  However, as that
equipment is retired, there will be inexpensive  opportunities  to replace  it with efficient, low-carbon-
emissions  technology.  In addition, exogenous  technological  progress  may result in cheaper  renewable
technologies over time. The combination approach gives both time and  motive for  buyers to
undertake  a  long-term technology development program that  will yield  enduring emissions
reductions,  while also  yielding  immediate  reductions  in net carbon enissions.
A bundling  deal makes sense for a buyer if the price of an allowance  or 'permanent' CER is expected
to go down, or to increase more slowly  than discount rate, between commitment periodsl4. This
mnight  happen in the near term, for instance,  if the early  supply of CDM projects is limited, as hosts
and project developers  struggle  to master an unfamiliar  market  with initially  high transactions costs.
Over the long run, simulations  of optimal timing of emissions  reductions suggest  that carbon prices
should rise at 3.5% annually over 2010-2040  (Nordhaus and Boyer 1999),  less  than the discount rate
of private  market participants.
"Bundling"  current sequestration  with future reductions  in assigned  amounts therefore allows more
cost-efficient  timning  of emissions reductions. Achieving  this result, however,  probably requires that
ermissions  caps for future periods be negotiated concurrently  with the right to bundle or borrow
against future allowances15.  If borrowing  were allowed  before future allowances  were determined,
14  See Schennach,  n.d.  for a discussion  of the intertemporal  dynamics  of emissions  allowance  pricing  when
allowances  can be banked, including  the conditions  under which prices can rise more slowly  than the discount
rate.
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negotiators would  strive to increase  the allowances  to cover existing  levels of borrowing. On the
other  hand, the  ability to  use sequestration to  borrow  against future allowances mnight  allow
negotiators to agree on more rapid rates of emissions  reductions  than might otherwise  be possible.
The relative  price of a sequestered  ton would depend on the expected  rate at which CER prices rise
between commitment periods. Suppose, for instance, that the current price of a CER is po, the
discount  rate is r, the  expected  price  five years  from  now  is p5  <po(l+r)5.  Then  a  buyer will be
willing  to pay
po -p5(l+r)-5
for a five year sequestration comrnitment.  (rhe price will be greater if partial credit is granted for
the  possibility that  sequestration will continue past  the  sequestration contract period.)  For
illustration,  if the discount rate is 10% and CER prices are expected to rise at 5%, then a five-year
sequestration  guarantee  would be worth about 22% of a "permanent" CER.
Tax LUCF CERs to fund emissions reduction technology research and development
An alternative  would be to have  the buyer of an LUCF-based  CER contribute  to a fund that finances
research  and development  in carbon-saving  technologies. The size of the contribution (which  would
act like a tax) would be inversely related to duration of the sequestration conmmitment.  The fund
could be used to invest in a venture capital fund to develop  renewable  energy  technologies. The host
country might be assigned a proportionate share of the royalties from any discoveries. The fund
might also be used to provide prizes for the inventors of emissions-reducing  technologies  that are
difficult to patent (following  the example of the famous longitude prize' for the first reliable naval
chronometer).  If these funds served to  advance the time at which renewable technologies are
adopted, worldwide, by even a few years, the emissions savings  would be quite large and rmight
compensate  for premature release  of sequestration-based  CERs.
Tradable development rights
An altemative to the project-based approach is to  adopt a sectoral or regional baseline on forest
emissions.  Emerging tradable development rights (TDR) mechanisms in Brazil (Chomitz 1999),
though not motivated by GHG  considerations,  provide a  template for establishing a defensible
baseline,  mininizing leakage,  and assuring  permanence.
A carbon-inspired  TDR scheme mnight  start with legislation  mandating protection of areas of unique
biodiversity (e.g. areas known to harbor endemic species)  or hydrological  interest (e.g. riverine
forests). It would then issue rights for forest conversion of x% of the remaining  area. Rights  would
be differentiated  by biome or ecosystem.  Ideally  the rights should be auctioned;  as a practical  matter,
most environmental  permits are 'grandfathered'. In this case,  they could be awarded  to landholders
who had preserved at least (1-x)% natural forest cover on their property.  Landholders would be
required by law to hold TDRs corresponding  to all  land not under natural  vegetation.
The overall conversion allowance  x would be chosen so that (1-x) is a large enough proportion to
maintain viability  of key ecosystem  populations, and that x is small enough so that there is demand
for the rights. A market for TDRs (tradable  within designated  ecosystems)  would tend to mirnmize
the opportunity cost of conserving  the domestically  desired (1-x)%  conservation allotment for each
ecosystem. TDRs  would  be  purchased by  landholders with  agroclimatically  attractive land,
convernent to  market.  Those  with low value land would find it more  attractive to  sell their
development  rights and leave the land under forest.  (See  Chomitz 1999 for a sirnulation  of how this
might work.)
With this mechanism in place, TDRs could be purchased and retired in  order to increase carbon
sequestration,  just as some environmentally-motivated  individuals  buy and retire S02 allowances  in
order to boost air quality. Retirement  of a TDR would ensure  that an additional  hectare of land willEvaluating  CarLn  Ofsets  17
remain perpetually  under forest.  Conservative  estimates of the marginal carbon density of forested
land could be used to translate a hectare of forest protection into tons of CERs.
Clearly such a  system requires sophisticated institutions for  administration.  If  it  could  be
implemented,  it would offer a number of advantages. It conserves  carbon at low opportunity cost in
foregone agricultural  production;  the losses in agricultural  production  may well be less  than the gains
in local cobenefits of forest conservation. It avoids the potential  moral hazard problem of inducing
countnes to relax their conservation  efforts so as to be able to claim CERs for creating protected
areas;  here, CERs are claimed  only for conservation  efforts beyond a reasonable expectation  of what
is required for domestic interests. By encompassing  a large geographic  area, leakage  is internalized  to
a large degree. By devoting  CER revenues  to agricultural  intensification  in existing  cultivated  lands,
the project can alleviate  poverty and further counteract leakage.  Finally,  by embedding  enforcement
in a broader legal structure for land use regulation,  the system creates a reasonable expectation of
permanence of sequestration.
Is such a system feasible  to set up?  There are some interesting recent precedents in Brazil (though
they are motivated by conservation  and have no connection with carbon). The point of departure is
current policy  debate in Brazil  to allow 'relocation'  or trade in landholders'  legal forest reserve (rezn
legal). This is a long-standing requirement that property owners maintain 20% of each property
under native vegetation  (50%  to 80% in the Amazon)  A recent trend towards increased  enforcement
of the rule has prompted recognition  that a property-wise  requirement  is, in theory, an economically
and environmentally  inefficient  way to  satisfy  an areal requirement for protection.  Consequently,
landowners and public officials  have been exploring options that allow landowners  to  satisfy  their
forest reserve requirements  off-site,  on areas of greater  ecological  significance  but lower opportunity
cost.  Provisional regulations  for 'relocation' or trade in legal reserve rights are under debate at the
national level and have been implemented  in the states of Minas Gerais  and Parana (Bemardes  1999).
Parana - a largely  deforested  state -- has implemented a system  which requires each landholder to file
a plan for achieving  compliance  with the 20% requirementl6. Compliance can be achieved either
through regeneration  of native vegetation  or by maintenance  of legal reserve on another property.
'Trading' of legal reserve is allowed  only within river basins in order to ensure full representation of
the state's biodiversity.
The Brazilian  examples  suggest  that a TDR scheme  may be both acceptable  and feasible. Analogous
mechanisms may  be devised  for areas  with weaker  institutional  structure. For instance,  Tipper (1998)
proposes a  sectoral baseline for the combined Oaxaca-Chiapas  region of Mexico, against which
carbon emissions  savings  can be reckoned.
Domestic  impacts
Carbon  projects  are  required to  contribute to  sustainable development, hoped  to  stimulate
technology  transfer, and feared  to endanger the environment.  Again each project must be evaluated
on its specific  merits
Sustainble  daeLekpeit Most carbon projects  provide an environmental  cobenefits.  For instance,  most
energy-efficiency  and fuel-switching  projects reduce emissions of particulates  and other harmful air
pollutants.  Most  forest  conservation and  regeneration projects  will  provide  biodiversity,
hydrological,  and recreational  benefits.
Employment and distributional impacts will be more varied.  Some fuel-switching  and energy-
efficiency  projects will involve switches  to more capital-intensive  technologies, with a consequent
16  SISLEG  - Sistema  De Manutencao,  Recuperacao  E Protecao  Da Reserva  Florestal  Legal  E Areas  De
Preservacao  Permanente,  created  by  decree  3  87/99.Evaluating  Carbon  Qfsets  18
loss of employment. Savings  may accrue  to the owners of large companies or to the consumers of
their products.  On the other hand, sustainable  biomass projects may provide employment to low-
wage workers. Agroforestry  and agricultural  intensification  projects may benefit the rural poor, both
landless  workers and smallholders.
TeChnolJg  transfer  Energy-related  carbon projects are sometimes thought to  be more favorable for
technology  transfer than forest carbon projects. The magnitude  and benefits of technology  transfer,
however,  will depend on the nature of the technology. Small-scale,  locally  replicable  technology  may
diffuse faster, and with greater impact on  employment and poverty alleviation,  than  large-scale
sophisticated technologies.  Diffusion and learning effects, for instance, have been observed for
small-scale  boiler technology (SEI 1998)  and for renewable energy technologies.  Similarly,  many
kinds of agroforestry  technologies  lend themselves  to local adoption, replication,  and diffusion and
may be particularly  important for combating  poverty among  the rural  poor.
Envivmnaa  npaats.  Both energy  and LUCF projects can cause environmental  damage.  Hydropower
dams,  for  instance, can directly or indirectly destroy natural habitats and  threaten fresh-water
biodiversity.  Forestry projects  involving  plantations of exotic monocultures  such as eucalyptus  raise a
number of potential concerns. Depending on the species  used, these may deplete groundwater  and
affect soil fertility. Some observers also fear that there could be perverse incentives to  deforest
standing forests in order to gain CERs from reforestation.
These risks are shared, of course, by projects that are not motivated by the CDM.  The standard
response is to institute a system of environmental  assessment  that screens out undesirable  projects
and assures  that others are implemented  in an environmentally  friendly  way. (Brown  1998)  Some of
these screens can be quite simple. For instance, a prospective plantation project (whether or not
motivated by the CDM) might be required  to show evidence  that the proposed site had already been
degraded  by, say, 1995. Worldwide  archives  of remote-sensing  imagery  are available  for this purpose.
Conclusions
Would-be  suppliers  of CERs face a variety  of challenges  in demonstrating  that their projects produce
real, additional, measurable, permanent emissions reductions in  a  socially and  environmentally
responsible fashion. Each  project  type  will  present  a  different  pattern  of  advantages and
disadvantages  in terms of demonstratirtg  consistency  with these criteria. For all the criteria except
permanence,  it is difficult  to find generic distinctions  between LUCF and energy  projects,  since each
of these two categories  comprises  a great variety  of project types. Instead,  the important distinctions
have to do with such things as:
*  The level and distribution  of direct financial  benefits  that result from the project
*  The degree to which the project  is integrated  with a broader physical  and economic  system
*  The internal  homogeneity  and geographic  dispersion  of the project components
*  The local replicability  of project technologies
These dimensions  cut across  the energy  vs. LUCF distinction.
The challenges  of setting  up offset markets are considerable. There are however some existing,  large
scale programs that  may provide useful lessons.  Most  importantly, demand-side management
incentive systems  in US utilities  reward  utilities  for saving  energy  (and  as a byproduct, reducing GHG
emissions) against a hypothetical baseline (Chomitz 1998, Hagler Bailly 1998).  A typical incentive
payment is roughly equivalent  to $20/ton of carbon17.  These programs have received rate-payer
17 Eto et al (1995)  report  mean  shareholder  incentives,  weighted  by program  size,  of 4 cents/kWh  in a sample
of 40 large  cormnercial  DSM  programs;  we apply  a rough  estimate  of an emissions  rate  of 200  tons  C/gWh.Evaling  arbon  Q&sets  19
funding  of over $16  billion. An econometric  study  by Parfomak  and Lave  (1996)  suggests  that the
utilities'  estimates  of energy  savings  are accurate  on average  (see Chomitz 1998 for a further
discussion).  Another  relevant  program  is the US Conservation  Reserve  Program,  which  pays  about
$1.6 billion/year  in incentives  for farmers  to replace  marginal  cropland  with trees and other
protective  vegetative  cover;  in 1997,  about 33 million  acres  were enrolled,  including  2.35 million
under tree cover. (USDA,  n.d.)  Analysis  of farmer  responsiveness  to these incentives  may  provide
useful  insights  into baseline-setting  and pernanence  in sequestration  projects.  (See  e.g. Parks  and
Schorr  1995).
Permanence  is an issue  specific  to LUCF  projects. Several  potential  approaches  are available.  The
ton-year  approach  focuses  on the benefits  from deferring  climatic  damage,  and rewards  longer
deferral. The combination  approach  assures  permanence  by bundling  current  LUCF CERs with
future reductions  in the buyer's  allowed  amount.  A technology-acceleration  approach  taxes  LUCF
CERs to  fund accelerated  research and development  of emissions  abatement  technology.  An
insurance  approach  adjusts  LUCF  CERs  for the risk of premature  release,  spreads  the risk across  a
world  portfolio  of projects,  and supports  institutions  that minimize  the risk.Evaluating  Carban  C)fsets  20
Appendix:  A stylized  model  of leakage
TIis highly stylized  model of leakage  is intended to illustrate  how the spatial structure of markets,
together with supply and demand  responses,  determine  the degree of carbon leakage  in a project that
protects forests or retires croplands.  For policy analysis,  it would be possible to  apply a fully
articulated empirical  model of spatial supply and demand, such as that of Chomitz, Griffiths, and
Punr  (1999).
Imagine a rectangular  island bisected by a road of length L along which the population lives. The
population demands an agricultural  good which can be produced at zero cost anywhere  on the island.
There is a fixed cost a  per ton-kilometer of transporting the good to the road, but transport costs
along the road are zero. The good sells at a price of P along the road.  Both farTngate  price p and
productivity  per hectare q decline  with distance  x from the road:
Marketrie  ofagriadtural ncmr* P
Distancefiomroad  x
Fargatepnce.  p(x) =P-ax  [a >0]
Farrnnprxi  i  q(x) = Pp(x) [3 >0]
Demand for the agricultural  good  QD  is a function of price:
Market  61&ad:  QD=y  -p2  [y,8 >0]
Cultivation  extends from the road to a frontier at distance  x-*  where the farrngate  price is 0:
Limit offaiatiz  x-=P/
Supply  is the total production  within the limnit  of cultivation  on both sides of the road:
Q  = 2L fq(x)dx  = L/3P 2 /a
0
Equating demand and supplyyields:
1
x*=-  +/  AL/a)
Everything  within distance x-' of the road is converted to agriculture;  beyond the frontier, carbon is
stored undisturbed  in forest cover.
Now suppose that a carbon project proposes to reforest the eastern half of the agricultural  land.
Retiring this land from agriculture  will drive up  the price of the agricultural  good, leading to  the
expansion  of the frontier in the western half of the island and consequently  to carbon leakage. The
new frontier in the western part of the island  will be
x * * =-y/(J  +c L12a)
a
Note however that the total area under  cultivation  has decreased: withdrawing some land from
cultivation did not result in hectare-for-hectare  leakage.  In the western half of the island, the new
frontier is not twice  as distant from the road as the old one, but rather has increased  by a ratio:Evaluatizg Cairhon  Ofsets  21
X*/  F9  =  +  |  +  lIa
±+  8L/  / 2a
(Of course, the effect on carbon leakage  depends on the carbon densities of the newly deforested
land and the newly reforested land.)  In the extreme case that demand is fixed and completely
insensitive to price (6=0) then  the new frontier has moved out by a  factor of 42, because the
reduction in supply is pardy compensated by increasing intensiveness of cultivation.  The more
elastic is demand, the lower the areal extent of leakage;  in the limit, when P is fixed, there is no
leakage  at all.Evaluating  Carbon  Ojfsets  22
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